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Abstract 
 
As the countries in East Asia embark on financial liberalization, a key issue that confronts 
policymakers is the greater complexity of risks that is injected into the financial system. In particular, 
capital account liberalization may potentially increase the vulnerability of individual countries to 
external financial shocks. This paper advocates the optimally cascading of financial liberalization that 
is consistent across three dimensions: extent of domestic financial liberalization; the degree of 
exchange rate flexibility; and the scope of capital account liberalization. Unless the process of 
liberalization is properly managed, it could provoke destabilizing capital flows and lead to volatile 
exchange rates. Smooth responses to fluctuating capital flows require accelerated institutional reforms 
in individual countries and an upgraded regional financial infrastructure. We argue that informal 
monetary arrangements, sequenced from simple to more intensive commitments, can go a long way in 
improving sovereign and regional institutions both to handle ongoing financial liberalization and to 
promote intra-regional currency stability.  
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1. Introduction 
It is well recognized that strong domestic financial markets can play a key role in economic 
growth and development. Sound financial institutions and well-functioning markets facilitate the 
mobilization and efficient allocation of savings, thereby improving productivity and contributing to 
growth (Levine 2004). This is particularly important for East Asia in view of the high saving rates of 
the regional countries. The limited development of local financial markets and their small fragmented 
nature have also led to a large part of Asian savings being intermediated outside the region. Surplus 
savings have mostly been channeled to the US and the funds return to Asia through US direct and 
portfolio investment. Fostering domestic financial markets and regional financial integration is 
important because it not only facilitates the intermediation of Asian savings within the region, but 
also attracts foreign investment in instruments denominated in the domestic currency. Such alternative 
sources of funding would reduce East Asia’s reliance on foreign currency borrowing and 
concomitantly, the risk exposure of the region to maturity and currency mismatches.  
  
However, as the countries in East Asia deregulate their financial sectors and develop their 
capital markets, a key issue that confronts policymakers is the greater complexity of risks that is 
injected into the financial system. In particular, capital account liberalization heightens the speed and 
magnitude of international spillovers and may potentially increase the vulnerability of individual 
countries to external financial shocks. Many studies have found empirical evidence that financial 
development and in particular, financial openness can increase a country’s vulnerability to crisis (see 
inter alia Rajan 2005 and Kaminsky and Reinhart 2003). In fact, considerable blame for the past 
financial cum currency crises has been placed on improper sequencing of liberalization.  
 
Over the past quarter century, the combination of a fixed exchange rate with an open capital 
account, has proven lethal in small open economies, particularly in emerging markets with weak 
financial systems and regulatory institutions. Indeed, for some countries, repeated crises have 
institutionalized such a lack of credibility as to taint them with what Eichengreen and Hausmann 
(1999) have termed “original sin.” The fault seems to point to policies that opened the capital account 
prematurely while keeping the exchange rate rigid. Such a combination has often led to massive 
capital inflows that have overwhelmed nascent financial systems, prompting consumption and asset 
boom-bust cycles. When we further combine a fixed exchange rate and premature opening of the 
capital account with a weakly structured and regulated domestic financial sector, currency crisis 
quickly turn into financial crisis and perhaps to full-blown economic and political crisis. Such a 
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scenario plagued Latin America throughout the 1980s and 1990s. It took the crisis of 1997-98 to 
demonstrate that Asia was also not immune to these same policy inconsistencies. 
 
Sufficiently liberalized and developed domestic financial sectors are necessary to absorb and 
allocate capital inflows to their most efficient uses. Flexible exchange rates allow necessary 
international relative price adjustments and help allow asset markets to clear (Obstfeld 2004). Without 
exchange rate flexibility, economic adjustments will take place in terms of the price level, output or 
employment, or asset market volatility (Frankel and Rose 1995). Unless domestic financial sectors are 
sufficiently developed and exchange rates sufficiently flexible, capital account liberalization is 
premature and effectively neutralizes the stability benefits of fixed exchange rates. That this does so 
at a time when the domestic financial infrastructure can ill-afford massive surges and reversals in 
liquidity and financing, has prompted a number of economists to remind policymakers and 
professional economists alike of the dangers of the open-economy trilemma. 2  Fully-open capital 
accounts require both domestic financial liberalization and exchange rate flexibility. This paper 
advocates the optimally cascading of financial liberalization that is consistent across three dimensions: 
extent of domestic financial liberalization; the degree of exchange rate flexibility; and the scope of 
capital account liberalization. 
 
Unless the process of liberalization is properly managed, it could provoke destabilizing 
capital flows and lead to volatile exchange rates. This highlights the need for regional cooperation of 
policy measures during the liberalization process, even though it is the domestic authorities and 
institutions that are ultimately responsibility for a country’s financial development and stability.3  
Indeed, the fall out from the Asian crisis made it clear that monetary policy cooperation does have an 
important role to play in avoiding future crises and in promoting further integration and regionalism 
in East Asia. The primary challenge appears to be how monetary policy cooperation can promote a 
reasonable degree of currency flexibility while minimizing the adverse effects of capital account 
liberalization on intra-regional currency stability. We argue for the sequencing of informal monetary 
arrangements from simple to more intensive commitments. Only when the East Asian countries could 
                                                 
2 The “Open-Economy Trilemma” refers to the idea that monetary policy can only achieve fully two of the 
following three dimensions: monetary policy independence, fixed exchange rates, and open capital accounts. 
See Obstfeld, Shambaugh, & Taylor (2004) for a treatise on the open economy trilemma. 
3 Of the policy implications arising from the Asian crisis, a significant number focused on the need for 
institutional reforms and changes in policy regimes at the sovereign level. Chow, et al. (2005) argues that the 
path towards greater intra-regional integration and stability must start with primarily with domestic-level 
reforms. 
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credibly commit to a path of future monetary union, then should formal monetary arrangements be 
considered to advance regional stability. 
 
 The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses the optimal 
cascading of financial liberalization while section 3 examines the risks arising from financial 
liberalization. Guidelines for monetary policy coordination and alternative regional monetary 
arrangements are proposed in sections 4 and 5 respectively. Section 6 concludes.  
 
2 Towards Optimal Cascading of Liberalization  
The Asian crisis of 1997-98 highlighted the dangers of poorly sequenced liberalization 
programs and the importance of minimizing the risks endemic to the open economy trilemma. A 
gradual approach to financial sector liberalization based on sequencing and preconditions is thus 
necessary to safeguard financial stability.4 The optimal sequencing literature pioneered by McKinnon 
(1973, 1993) among others suggests a simple sequential structure to financial liberalization: first, 
liberalize the domestic financial sector; second, allow for exchange rate flexibility; third and only then, 
liberalize the capital account (see Falvey & Kim 1992 for a survey). While this simple set of 
guidelines governing liberalization has become de facto policy of the IMF and elsewhere, it is 
empirically unsupportable and potentially misleading to policymakers. 
 
Optimal sequencing presupposes a linear path towards full liberalization and suggests that 
once the domestic financial sector is completely liberalized and the exchange rate is fully flexible, 
then and only then, should steps be taken to liberalize the capital account. This implicitly removes all 
benefits of capital account liberalization in the early stages of financial sector development. Optimal 
sequencing also suggests that exchange rate flexibility should take place after domestic financial 
liberalization. This implies that domestic financial liberalization can fully mature without the benefits 
of the broader risk management skills and increased financial product innovation that would 
accompany exchange rate flexibility.5 Moreover, optimal sequencing appears to discount how even a 
small degree of exchange rate flexibility might alleviate the real adjustment costs associated with real 
and financial shocks.6
                                                 
4 We note that various countries in East Asia including Japan, Hong Kong and Singapore among others are 
already relative advanced in their reform program. 
5 Prasad, et al (2005) argues that increasing the flexibility of the yuan while China continues with its domestic 
financial reforms are in China’s best interest.  
6 In comparing the experiences of Singapore and Hong Kong during the Asian Financial Crisis, Yip (2005) 
argues that Singapore’s exchange rate flexibility enabled it to handle the crisis without the steep output losses 
experienced by Hong Kong. 
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Instead of optimal sequencing, we propose the cascading of financial liberalization whereby 
all three dimensions of a liberalization program are implemented simultaneously. Under optimal 
cascading, selected lifting of capital controls and a limited degree of exchange rate flexibility can take 
place while the domestic financial sector is developing. As the domestic financial sector deepens, 
increased exchange rate flexibility and an increasingly liberalized capital account will not only be 
possible but optimal. 
 
2.1  Optimal Sequencing  
Under optimal sequencing, liberalization occurs sequentially. Let Ai ∈[A1 ,…, An] represent 
the ith of n different stages of domestic financial sector liberalization. Let Bi ∈[B1 ,…, Bn] represent 
the ith of n different degrees of exchange rate flexibility. Here, one can think of B1 as a pegged 
bilateral exchange rate and Bn as a fully floating exchange rate. Finally, let Ci ∈[C1 ,…, Cn] represent 
the ith of n different stages of capital account liberalization. A strict interpretation of optimal 
sequencing suggests the following conceptual framework: 
 
 
 
That is to say, first, a domestic financial sector liberalization program must be developed and 
implemented, i.e. all n phases of A are completed. Once domestic financial sector liberalization is 
fully completed, only then should the degree of exchange rate flexibility (given by the vector of B’s) 
be increased. Since it generally recommended that smaller degrees of flexibility should precede full 
floats, the exchange rate flexibility dimension of financial liberalization is complete when all n 
degrees of B are permitted.  Finally, once the domestic financial sector is liberalized (i.e., A has gone 
from A1 to An) and the exchange rate is fully flexible (i.e., B has gone from B1 to Bn) then and only 
then, should steps be taken to liberalize the capital account, C. As with domestic financial sector 
liberalization, capital account liberalization has its baby steps (something closer to C1) like FDI or 
long-term investments for infrastructural purposes, its more advanced like the full liberalization of 
short-term portfolio flows to its most fully liberalized and controversial phases, the allowance of 
short-term speculative flows, such as those from hedge funds (something closer to Cn). 
 
In practice, sequencing is subject to considerable leakage. As markets grow and domestic 
financial sectors develop, there will be some degree of capital flow across borders even with the best 
of capital controls. But at the same time, the costs of capital controls enable disparities in productivity 
and competitiveness between global and insular markets to persist. Global markets are fiercely 
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competitive and offer the truest test of productivity. It is highly unlikely that domestic financial 
sectors might develop the same quality and character of global financial markets on their own.  
 
2.2  Optimal Cascading 
In contrast to optimal sequencing, the conceptual framework of optimal cascading requires 
decisions regarding the extent of domestic financial liberalization, the degree of exchange rate 
flexibility and the extent of capital account liberalization are taken simultaneously. Let the ith phase 
of a liberalization program be given by (Ai , Bi , Ci), then the design of an optimal cascading program 
can be represented by the following rubric: 
 
 
 
During nascent stages of domestic financial development, rigid exchange rates and heavy capital 
controls are essential and will minimize the odds of boom-bust cycles and financial crisis. However, 
as the domestic financial sector matures, countries should make attempts to increase exchange rate 
flexibility and allow for longer term and stable capital inflows that serve to increase productivity, 
technology transfer and competitiveness.7  
 
Empirical studies, such as Chinn and Ito (2002), show that the positive growth effects of 
financial market development and capital account liberalization tended to be larger for countries with 
higher level of institutional development. This suggests that the establishment of robust institutions 
supporting the financial markets—such as prudential regulation and supervision framework, and 
corporate governance structure—is a pre-requisite to successful liberalization. Nonetheless, as pointed 
out by Kaminsky and Schmukler (2003), institutional reforms are most likely to occur after rather 
than before financial liberalization. This is partly because established firms tend to oppose 
institutional changes for fear of increased competition and in order to safeguard their interest. Hence, 
partial liberalization is often needed to act as a trigger and add to the urgency of institutional reforms  
 
In latter stages, domestic financial sector liberalization will need both increased exchange rate 
flexibility, to help with risk management and price stability, as well as later-stage capital account 
liberalization, such as capital outflows for the purpose of portfolio diversification and the 
establishment of foreign banking branches and non-bank financial institutions. The 
                                                 
7  See Williamson and Mahar (1998) for a breakdown of different capital flows and their roles in the 
liberalization programs.   
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internationalization of financial services which opens the domestic sector to foreign financial 
institutions frequently results in capacity building. Importantly, the commercial presence of foreign 
service providers normally increases the pressure to strengthen supervisory and regulatory framework. 
This can occur through many channels such as providing a model of best practices, reducing 
information gaps and improving transparency, and skill and technology transfer (Kono and 
Schuknecht 1998). 
 
Once such a liberalization program is fully mature, the degree of exchange rate flexibility can 
be increased further. Mature domestic financial systems will be able to utilize exchange rate volatility 
to help adjust to shocks, smooth consumption, and help maintain price stability. At the same time, it is 
unrealistic to expect that domestic financial liberalization can ever fully mature without exposure to 
global financial markets and capital flows, particularly in countries without a long history of private 
financial banking and established access to offshore banking. In addition, deeper capital account 
liberalization will require increased exchange rate flexibility and liberalized domestic financial 
markets. 
  
China’s liberalization program represents the classic case of optimal cascading. From 1994 
until late 2005, the yuan was pegged to the US Dollar at a fixed rate of 8.28RMB to US$1. Citing 
underdeveloped domestic financial markets and legal institutions, the Chinese central bank argued 
unambiguously that its banking system was not ready to handle a flexible yuan. While the yuan 
remained fixed to the US dollar, China did not completely restrict capital flows. China has been the 
recipient of considerable FDI capital flows and other types of capital flows that have leaked in 
through the considerable presence of foreign branch operations and outsourcing operations. Most 
recently, the Chinese central bank has allowed the yuan to float within a tight band while at the same 
time domestic financial sector reforms and a measured relaxation of capital controls continues 
(Eichengreen 2005). These simultaneous and holistic policy choices characterize the measured and 
gradual face of optimal cascading. While it is too early to tell if the specific types of capital account 
liberalization enacted by China are wise given the stage of domestic sector development and limited 
degree of exchange rate flexibility, it is clear that China had adopted the prudent and realistic strategy 
of optimal cascading.8
 
                                                 
8  Eichengreen (2005) expresses worry that China’s efforts to dismantle capital controls may occurring 
prematurely while efforts to increase flexibility are being implemented too slowly. More generally, the 
cascading approach is difficult to operationalize in practice. 
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3. Risks of Liberalization on Intra-Regional Currency Stability 
The lifting of capital controls, even under optimal cascading of financial liberalization, will 
expose the East Asian countries to swings in global capital flows. Nevertheless, it is crucial to make 
the important distinction between currency stability and currency flexibility when examining risks of 
liberalization. On one hand, currency instability reflects the inability of monetary instruments to 
impact the trend or direction of currency movements, and fundamentally, deep institutional problems 
and liberalization programs that are inconsistent with the choice of monetary regime. These can result 
in dramatic movements of the currency irrespective of underlying fundamentals. Emerging market 
crises which featured dramatically tragic collapses in exchange rates and subsequent loss of 
institutional credibility are clear examples of currency instability.  As demonstrated by the European 
Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) crisis of 1992-93, the specter of currency instability is not limited 
to emerging markets. 
 
On the other hand, currency flexibility reflects day-to-day adjustments, secular trends, and the 
establishment of normal market equilibrium which should not be economically, institutionally or 
politically destabilizing in the sense of generating panic, causing regime change, or leading to the 
absence of markets. The sharp fall of the yen in 1998, while clearly volatile from a statistical 
perspective, was not unstable in a deeper sense. The ability to differentiate these two forms of 
currency movements is absolutely critical. The prevention of currency flexibility via a fixed exchange 
rate has led to periods of devastating currency instability. Whereas, periods of large currency 
fluctuations have not necessarily had any impact on currency instability and in a real sense have led to 
the broadening and deepening of financial markets. We argue that more often than not, exchange rate 
flexibility is an integral component of exchange rate stability.  
 
Strictly speaking, there is nothing inherent to capital account liberalization that suggests intra-
regional currency instability. Properly cascaded liberalization need not have any destabilizing effects 
on the matrix of currency prices in the region. Some countries, for instance Singapore, have 
successfully cascaded their liberalization using an appropriate monetary policy regime which if 
anything served to strengthen the stability of the currency. Of course, one would expect that 
liberalization will generate winners and losers domestically and regionally such that the nature of 
currency fluctuations will be affected. Often times, such increases in the volatility of currency 
fluctuations will not only reflect healthy and stable policy regimes, but can serve to reduce welfare-
losses from real and monetary shocks. 
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However, poorly planned liberalization programs in one or more countries, particularly in the 
larger and more regionally-integrated states, can not only lead to currency instability in the region, but 
lead to a region-wide financial crisis. As mentioned earlier, the Tequila crisis of 1994-95 and the 
Asian crisis of 1997-98 were perfect examples of the failure to reconcile open capital accounts with 
the exchange rate regime and institutional development of domestic financial sector. Interestingly 
enough, in a number of currency crises, currency instability was preceded by long periods of limited 
currency fluctuations. This seeming contradiction underscores the importance of differentiating 
currency flexibility from currency instability. 
 
For East Asia, we identify the risks associated with financial liberalization in China as 
representing the greatest challenge to intra-regional currency stability. Ironically, it is a testimony to 
the growing importance of China as a global economic force that her policy actions represent both the 
key to future regional economic prosperity and the biggest threat of destabilization. Owing to her size 
and growing exports from the region, it is abundantly clear that failed liberalization in China would 
create considerable turmoil in goods, credit, and currency markets. Opening up the capital account too 
quickly may lead to massive capital flight as Chinese investors seeking portfolio diversification would 
have additional reason to remove capital. Improper cascading risks financial panic by exposing 
underperforming banks and implicitly increasing government liabilities due to moral hazard concerns. 
China’s rapidly expanding regional imports, her dominance of FDI in emerging Asia, and the growth 
of her domestic financial sector suggests that failed liberalization and attending problems associated 
with institutional credibility would have both direct and indirect effects on regional currency stability. 
The former include impacts on real growth rates, while the latter include the redirection of real and 
financial investments to other markets. 
 
To minimize such risks, China must cascade its financial liberalization very carefully. Her 
approach should emphasize domestic financial reforms, market-based basis for the level of the 
exchange rate, increased exchange rate flexibility, and a gradual removal of capital controls, 
especially those that will improve economic efficiency, risk management, productivity and 
competitiveness. China should also ensure that price stability prevails and fiscal dominance is avoided. 
Doing so will give China a better opportunity to carry out its liberalization program. 
 
However, what makes China unique in this discussion is that intra-regional currency 
instability may arise even if its financial liberalization is cascaded optimally.  Successful financial 
liberalization in China will generate massive capital flows within the region. If domestic financial 
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institutions in the region have not been sufficiently reformed, the risks to those countries with open 
capital accounts and fairly rigid exchange rates may overtime generate conditions similar to the Asian 
crisis. In a sense, capital account liberalization in China represents an exogenous force on regional 
institutional reform efforts. Failure to fully endogenize this force may pose more of a threat to 
domestic financial stability than domestic factors. Therefore, not only is successfully cascaded 
liberalization in China essential for regional stability, but the very prospect of financial liberalization 
in China necessitates that other Asian countries accelerate their own institutional reforms in advance.  
 
4.  The Potential of Monetary Policy Coordination 
Given the risks of liberalization, we assess the potential of regional monetary policy 
coordination that promotes intra-regional currency stability at a time of lifting capital controls. To this 
end, we highlight seven guiding principles of monetary policy coordination  as well as characterize 
the relevant economic realities of East Asia. These guidelines extend beyond the technical criteria for 
determining an Optimal Currency Area (OCA) commonly seen in discussions on monetary union.9 
We include other factors like similarity of institutional development, degree of corporate transparency 
and extent of political commitment which are also crucial for the ultimate success of monetary 
unification. The list, albeit not exhaustive, serves as a set of ideal benchmarks for countries 
contemplating participation in a regional monetary arrangement. Should these ideals fail to be met, 
participating countries must find some form of accommodation. This can take the form of flexibility 
in the timelines to which countries take part in the regional monetary arrangement. Accommodation 
can also mean postponing the tightly coordinated policy actions of formal policy coordination in favor 
of vigorous implementation of the “loose” form of informal cooperation. The guiding principles are as 
follows. 
 
First, participating countries should possess a similar degree of institutional development, 
particularly with the deepening of respective domestic financial sectors. According to Eichengreen et 
al. (1999), the core institutional infrastructure required for well-functioning of the financial markets 
include adequate and well-enforced contracts, insolvency procedures, adequate accounting rules, 
consistent auditing and disclosure practices, and efficient payment system. Currently, the wide range 
of institutional development in East Asia is far in excess of that in Europe before the ERM. Such 
disparity requires that any regional monetary arrangement should ensure that resulting exchange rate 
                                                 
9 As outlined in Baldwin and Wyplosz (2004), pp 335-340, these are (i) labor mobility, (ii) Production 
diversification, (iii) openness, (iv) fiscal transfers, (v) homogenous preferences, and finally, (vi) regionalism vs. 
nationalism. 
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flexibility or interest rate movements do not pose risks to financial stability across participating 
countries. 
  
Second, participating countries should possess sufficient fiscal sophistication to use taxes and 
transfers to alleviate requisite adjustments and be free from fiscal dominance. Until the Asian crisis, 
most regional governments ran modest fiscal surpluses. While private savings rates continue to run 
high, the exceptional fiscal restraint over the years has given way to moderate to large fiscal deficits 
in nearly all East Asian countries post crisis (ADB 2005). Singapore is the clear exception, running 
fiscal surpluses that averaged above 4% of GDP from 2001-2005. The largest fiscal deficits have been 
run in Japan, Laos, the Philippines and Vietnam each averaging at least 4% of GDP since 2000. While 
fiscal dominance in most countries is not presently worrisome, fiscal management may become a 
topic of concern in the not-too-distant future. Participation in coordinated monetary arrangements 
demands that countries use fiscal policy to address issues regarding distribution.  
 
 Third, participating countries should offer partner countries a large degree of policy and 
corporate transparency. Monetary policy must be adequately prepared for the potential of moral 
hazard fallout from financial and corporate balance sheets. One of the lessons of the Asian crisis was 
the need to improve transparency in domestic banking systems and with local corporations. While 
significant reforms have been instituted, full disclosure to private financial markets and to 
government regulators remains a work in progress. Moreover, the degree of transparency in the region 
is quite varied. The lack of transparency clouds understanding of monetary transmission and adds 
considerable uncertainty into the expected dynamics that would arise from regional monetary 
arrangements. There is also a need to harmonize reporting and accounting standards in the region. 
 
Fourth, participating countries should possess similar trade and capital flow patterns, with 
expectations that these patterns will persist into the foreseeable future. Ideally, regional monetary 
policy arrangements, such as formal exchange rate arrangements, will operate more smoothly when 
operated for countries with similar trade and capital flows. For countries undergoing dramatic 
structural change, formal monetary policy coordination may offer formidable challenges to the 
management of those changes. At the same time, such dynamism from a participating country, 
particularly if influential, presents a separate set of challenges to the monetary arrangement itself. 
Possible impacts include imprecise forecasting, instrument errors, measurement error and the need to 
update data collection and weighting more frequently.  
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In contrast to European trade prior to the ERM, international trade of East Asian countries is 
well-diversified. Exports to the US and the EU combined represent roughly 30-35% of East Asian 
trade (ADB 2005). Such large shares seem to argue against monetary arrangements that seek to 
harmonize regional currency movements at the expense of increased volatility with US Dollar and the 
Euro. If the currencies movements are to be limited, the data suggests inclusion of the US Dollar and 
the Euro in any such arrangement. The practicing of dollar-invoicing (McKinnon and Schnabl 2004) 
adds to this suggestion. However, trade flows are only one consideration for policymakers. Capital 
flows are another. With the size of the foreign exchange markets dwarfing good markets, it is 
important to note that the stabilization benefits of monetary independence lies more with asset market 
equilibrium than with effective expenditure switching in goods markets (Obstfeld 2004). The flow of 
capital in and around Asia is largely in terms of the US Dollar. Optimal risk management then 
dictates that stabilization of the US dollar rate is given more weight in central bank loss functions. 
Certainly, the return to de facto USD pegs (termed “Bretton Woods II” by Dooley et al., 2004) 
implies that Asian central banks place great importance on US dollar stabilization in a manner 
disproportionate to trade flows. 
 
Fifth, participating countries should face similar shocks and have similar enough industrial 
structures, elasticities, and agent behavior such that they respond to these shocks in a similar fashion. 
Countries which have vastly different monetary policy transmission channels will likely require 
different monetary policy responses and even different monetary policy regimes. The economic 
structure of a country will have an impact both on the preferred exchange rate trends and on 
equilibrium responses to real and monetary shocks. Moreover, structural changes would reinforce 
these differentials. For instance, countries with large pools of unskilled labor and primary goods will 
benefit from export-friendly exchange rates. However, as countries move “up the value chain” and 
add more value-added and use imported intermediate goods, stronger exchange rates are beneficial to 
both price stability and growth. Given the large range of economic diversity and dynamism in East 
Asia, regional monetary arrangements will require flexibility and frequent adjustments. 
 
With respect to macroeconomic shocks hitting the individual countries, these are typically 
identified using long run restrictions in vector autoregressive models. Many studies compare the 
symmetry of these shocks as well as the similarity of the macroeconomic response they generate, in 
East Asia to those of Europe in the pre-euro period (see Watanabe and Ogura 2006 for a survey). 
Although the criteria for optimal currency area appear to be met by some subsets of Asian countries, 
the overall empirical evidence on the suitability of the East Asia region as an optimum currency area 
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is mixed. For instance, Zhang et al. (2004) find supply shocks as having positive correlations in 22% 
of all bilateral relationships among the 10 Asian countries, while the corresponding figure for the 14 
European countries is 27%.10 As for macroeconomic response, the authors find the size of GDP 
increases in response to 1% of supply shocks over 5 years to be in the range of 0.009 to 0.03% for 
Asia, vis-à-vis the range of 0.008 to 0.019% for Europe. Apparently, East Asia is comparable to 
Europe in meeting these two OCA criteria. In contrast, Chow and Kim (2003) found the region to be 
dominated by domestic rather than common regional shocks, thereby concluding that formal 
monetary policy coordination is costly for East Asia. 
 
Sixth, participating countries must be willing to credibly commit to the success of the 
monetary arrangement and its dominance over purely sovereign objectives. By definition, monetary 
arrangements require commitment to regional policy making. The primary motivation for these 
arrangements is to develop the experience, technical skills and regionalism that can lead to successful 
monetary union.  Provided institutional reforms have been successfully and commitment to monetary 
policy coordination is credible, adoption of formal monetary arrangements offers participating 
countries the potential of improving upon the results from purely sovereign policy. Therefore, success 
of the regional arrangement must trump sovereign concerns even if for a given shock, the sovereign 
policy response is welfare dominant. 
 
Seven, participating countries must be willing to achieve political consensus over policy 
prescriptions and must be willing to institute political and economic reforms to ensure continued 
stability of the monetary arrangement. The potential benefit of regional arrangements can only be 
realized if there is multilateral cooperation and consensus. Furthermore, as regional economic 
integration continues, regional monetary arrangements will require that policymakers implement 
economic and institutional reforms that might otherwise be unnecessary under sovereign monetary 
policy.11 Eichengreen and Bayoumi (1996) argued that the region was not ready for monetary union 
in view of political considerations.  
 
                                                 
10 Quarterly data over the sample period of 1980-2000 are used for Asia and Europe respectively. The 10 
Asian countries include Japan, China, the NIES and ASEAN4 countries, while the 14 European countries are 
Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK, and the Euroarea countries excluding Greece, Ireland, and 
Luxemburg.  
11 For some countries, participation in a formal monetary arrangement offers the change to break domestic 
political strangleholds on monetary policy. These countries are willing to join a formal monetary arrangement 
just order to “borrow” institutional discipline and credibility by having it imposed by regional agreement. 
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The above considerations suggest that the adoption of formally-coordinated regional policies, 
if desired, should proceed gradually. However, there is theoretical evidence that suggests that 
economic structure itself is endogenous to the choice of monetary policy regime (Corsetti and Pesenti 
2005). This literature suggests that provided there is credible and firm commitment, the construction 
of an Asian monetary system or monetary union may itself generate the regionalism necessary for its 
maintenance. Yet even this perspective requires that at a minimum, Asian political leaders must begin 
to define economic successes along regional lines. The uncertainty regarding regionalism in Asian 
policy circles supports arguments in favor a gradualist approach to regionalism, such as “learning to 
coordinate” or “learning to regionalize.” This approach will leave room for independence toward 
sovereign objectives until sufficient consensus and commitment towards regionalism warrants formal 
coordination.12  
  
5.  Alternative Regional Monetary Arrangements 
While formal monetary policy coordination refers to a structured and contractual regional 
monetary arrangement, the constraints of informal monetary policy cooperation are soft with 
obligations that are neither contractual nor binding. In this section, we consider three different forms 
of informal monetary arrangements using: (a) status quo regimes; (b) common objective variables; 
and (c) common regimes. We propose that the region approach the notion of monetary policy 
cooperation as a series of nested sequencing problems, from status quo sovereign regimes through 
increasingly intensive informal modes of monetary policy cooperation. Informal monetary policy 
cooperation offers the majority of benefits suggested by formal monetary arrangements. Informal 
cooperation also places greater emphasis on greater intimacy with one’s own sovereign monetary 
policy and with efforts to create a common knowledge base and research infrastructure. Improved 
sovereign stabilization policies and closer informal cooperation suggest that formal monetary 
arrangements are not necessary to achieve intra-regional currency stability. 
 
5.1  Informal Cooperation Using Status Quo Regimes  
The simplest mode of monetary policy cooperation would be for East Asian countries to use 
their existing policy regimes while pursuing non-monetary policy cooperation. This includes informal 
modes of financial cooperation like technical assistance and training programs that develop human 
capital and increase availability of financial information. Such cooperation is necessary in order to 
                                                 
12 An example of “loose” coordination would be the ERM after the 1992-93 crisis in which exchange rate bands 
were widened to +/- 15%. While one can argue that at such tolerances, the economic rationale behind the EMS 
no longer applied, the mere existence of the ERM permitted the regional monetary policy dialogue to continue. 
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strengthen risk management and prudential supervision as more risks are injected in the financial 
system. Further, financial institutional reforms that reduce costs of and impediments to cross-border 
transactions as well as the harmonization of regional standards and regulations are needed to promote 
capital market integration within East Asia. While central banks in East Asia optimize the current 
sovereign monetary policy regime, intensive non-monetary cooperation will offer countries a great 
opportunity to learn about the subtleties of monetary policy cooperation. 
 
An integral component of informal monetary policy cooperation is the implementation of 
sovereign institutional reforms and the creation of new regional institutions. Informal monetary policy 
cooperation and intensive non-monetary policy cooperation can together increase the ability of 
financial systems and private firms to absorb fluctuations in capital flows. These reforms alone will 
promote intra-regional currency stability. Additionally, emergency management procedures through 
an explicit regional institution will help slow the spread of any potential financial contagion that 
might arise. Even the simplest mode of informal monetary policy cooperation can help develop 
“financial circuit breakers” which can enable policymakers the time to locate the specific cause of a 
given crisis and the opportunity to find an appropriate resolution.  
 
Formal arrangements are neither necessary nor sufficient conditions in the creation of an 
esprit de corps among regional policymakers. Informal yet vigorous cooperation can go a long way in 
improving sovereign and regional institutions both to handle ongoing financial liberalization and to 
promote intra-regional currency stability. An example of this are the lessons learned from Singapore’s 
management of the Asian crisis. Her use of exchange controls led to a number of countries to beef up 
their own exchange controls. 
 
5.2 Informal Cooperation Using Common Policy Objectives 
More explicitly, informal monetary policy cooperation could agree to a common set of 
objective variables. The vast monetary policy literature that has developed over the years points to 
three primary objectives of monetary policy. These targeting objectives come directly from a welfare-
theoretic understanding of the social loss function. While ad hoc loss functions have been around for 
some time, it was the publication of Woodford (1999) that signaled a new approach. In a simple 
closed-economy, dynamic general-equilibrium New Keynesian model, Woodford used a linear 
approximation to the utility function of the representative agent to derive an exact representation of 
the social welfare loss function. This first welfare-theoretic loss function suggested that central banks 
should be concerned about stabilizing a weighted average of the variance of inflation around its target 
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and the variance of steady-state deviations of real marginal costs. Subsequent writings in Woodford 
(2003) extend the simple New Keynesian model to add the variance of the instrument itself for the 
purpose of financial market stabilization. 
 
A review of central bank pronouncements also essentially suggests the adoption of the three 
primary objectives of monetary policy: price stability, output gap or unemployment stability, and 
financial stability. Theoretically, one can derive social welfare loss functions with far more economic 
variables, particularly in open economy models (Batini, et al. 2001). While more appealing 
theoretically, communicating complex targeting operations has implicit costs to central banks who 
seek to manage private sector expectations. The first objective and most often mandated in the 
charters of central banks, is the pursuit of price stability. In support of this perspective, most modern 
New Keynesian policy models feature an overwhelming weight on price stability in the social welfare 
loss function (Woodford 2003). 
 
The second objective most commonly voiced involves stabilizing some measure of the real 
sector. This is often stated in terms of either the output gap or the deviation of employment from its 
natural rate. Theoretical models tend to give this second objective far less weight than price stability. 
In the open-economy model of Gali and Monacelli (2005), the weight on inflation stabilization is 
some forty-three times that of output gap stabilization! Nevertheless, real side objectives are 
important, economically as well as politically, particularly in countries where wage rigidities are 
prevalent. The third objective is less well understood theoretically but of great importance to many 
central bankers: financial stability. While curiously missing from many modern monetary models,13 
explicit financial-stability objectives were at the heart of Alan Greenspan’s risk management 
approach to monetary policy (Greenspan 2005). The risk management approach to monetary policy 
argues that monetary policy management should concern itself not just with average outcomes, but 
with low probability outcomes. Furthermore, where possible, the Federal Reserve should move to 
actively neutralize threats from low probability outcomes. 
 
In East Asia, a major challenge for regional central banks is in trying to realize all three 
objectives of monetary policy simultaneously while managing financial liberalization and institutional 
reforms. Besides, the concern with avoiding financial crises is likely the force behind the dominant 
preoccupation with fluctuations in the exchange rate and the well-known “fear of floating”.  Informal 
                                                 
13 An explanation for this glaring omission resides with the fact that most modern models are developed with 
the US or Europe in mind, where financial market strength and depth are assumed. 
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monetary policy cooperation help address the challenges facing regional central banks by helping 
policymakers craft a region-wide mandate that central banks pursue the same three objectives. Such a 
mandate might also specify metrics, intermediate targets, and country-specific tolerances, particularly 
given the wide range of financial liberalization in the region. Additionally, ground rules on agreeing 
to what constitutes long-run levels of the exchange rate would build in elements of determinacy and 
secular trends. 
 
This second mode of informal monetary policy cooperation should be sequenced following 
the basic form of informal monetary policy cooperation with status quo regimes. Going well beyond 
information sharing and non-monetary policy cooperation, it would require that regional central 
bankers to adopt a common conceptual framework. National central banks would still retain 
discretion over regime choice. However, central banks would agree to a shared interpretation on the 
concept and role of monetary policy. For a region which remains tied to the semantics of Bretton 
Woods, agreement to a common set of objective variables for monetary policy will require some 
effort. However, by adopting the same three target objectives, monetary policymakers can better 
promote intra-regional currency stability. Policy cooperation over the cascading of liberalization and 
the potential spillover effects would also be better managed with a common understanding over the 
objectives of monetary policy (Genberg 2006).  
 
In addition, with common objectives and a single conceptual framework for monetary policy, 
East Asia will be able to accelerate the development of regional institutions, harmonization of 
standards, regional surveillance, adjustment mechanisms, and crisis management techniques. Each 
will provide added support to the relation to lifting capital controls. Finally, successful adoption of 
consistent set of policy objectives will prepare the region for deeper informal monetary policy 
cooperation. 
 
5.3 Informal Cooperation Using Common Policy Regimes 
Benigno and Benigno (2003) showed in a two-country model that the use of inflation 
targeting in both countries can achieve the same beneficial welfare effects as formal policy 
coordination. Their findings are consistent with a large literature that emphasizes the dominant 
benefits of stabilization policies over formal coordination. Such findings also suggest a third mode of 
informal monetary policy cooperation: the adoption of common policy regimes throughout the region. 
Agreeing to a common conceptual framework for and the primary policy objectives of monetary 
policy will in all likelihood prove far more challenging and time-consuming. Nonetheless, once East 
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Asia has reached the stage in which it is ready to adopt a common policy regime, the Basket-Band-
Crawl (BBC) system with country-specific baskets would appear to have the most receptive audience 
for this purpose. Given the current prominence of exchange rate management among central banks in 
the region, it will be easier institutionally to adopt a common set of BBC regimes than say inflation 
targeting regimes. 
 
While inflation targeting is the current trend for open economy monetary regimes, several 
authors are quick to point out that efficient and credible operation of inflation targeting requires that 
numerous conditions be met. These include, central bank independence, freedom from fiscal 
dominance, policy transparency, a research infrastructure that would enable policymakers to make 
precise forecasts, and sufficiently developed financial markets (Mishkin 2000). More Specifically, 
Bernanke (2004) argues that a sufficiently-sophisticated research staff, sufficiently-sophisticated 
models and forecasting techniques, and sufficiently-fine data are required to realize the potential 
stabilization benefits of inflation targeting. Clearly, the operation of economic policy will always 
benefit from the most advanced techniques, human capital and knowledge base. However, informal 
monetary policy cooperation using inflation targeting should not take place until a modern research 
infrastructure has been successfully established. 
 
An alternative to inflation targeting would be informally coordinating through the common 
adoption of a BBC system with country-specific baskets (Williamson 1999). Quite literally, a BBC 
system has three primary components. The basket is the central parity around which exchange rate 
movements are compared. For country-specific baskets, each country’s currency is related to its own 
weighted basket of currencies of its major trading partners. In comparison, a common basket refers to 
using the same weighted basket of currencies, i.e. identical weights and component currencies, for all 
countries in the region. Unless trade patterns are similar across the region, using country-specific 
baskets would be more suitable than a common currency basket for exchange rate management in  
countries (de Brouwer 2004). The band is the amount of tolerance around the basket, within which the 
domestic currency is allowed to float. The crawl refers to periodic adjustments in small steps in the 
central parity to keep in line with changes in productivity and long-term fundamentals over time. This 
circumvents the buildup of a situation where the domestic currency becomes significantly overvalued 
or undervalued. The BBC system can also be modified to suit the diversity of financial liberalization 
in East Asia. Changes in the band, crawl, and basket can each be shaped for a given country. 
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A review of the target zone literature as seen in Krugman (1991) and Svensson (1991), 
suggests that as with fixed exchange rates, there comes a time when a central bank must decide on 
whether of not to defend the band. Williamson (1998) makes a distinction between a crawling band 
whereby the central bank is obliged to carry out foreign exchange intervention whenever the bounds 
are breached, versus a monitoring band whereby the central bank is obliged to avoid intervening 
within the band except to smooth out exchange rate volatility. In any case, credible commitment to 
the regime is of utmost importance. Further, the structure of a BBC potentially invites the prospect of 
one-sided bets and speculative attacks. Targeting regimes and closely-related simple instrument rules 
can circumvent such attacks by giving little opportunity to speculate on fixed targets. Historically, 
BBC regimes have tended to be fairly explicit.14  Certainly, policymakers can built-in such features 
into a BBC, by blurring the edges of bands, not disclosing them at all or by using the crawl as a way 
around the hard constraint of the band.  
 
To a large degree, the BBC system can be operated to achieve the same objectives as inflation 
targeting. For example, Singapore operates its monetary policy in a manner as sort of a hybrid 
between the two: using a BBC with an adjustable band to track the movement of its instrument, while 
setting its instrument in a way to hit intermediate targets as a means to control inflation and achieve 
non-inflationary growth (Khor et al. 2004). An advantage over the inflation target regime is the BBC 
which puts an explicit focus on currency movements is a far easier framework to communicate to the 
public, particularly in a region driven by exports. Private agents understand the exchange rate, widths 
of the band, the edges of bands, and shifts in the band. Those same agents are not as clear on the 
elements of inflation targeting such as the output gap, weighting matrices, the “natural” rate of 
unemployment (related to “potential” output), intermediate targets, and forecasts. A common BBC 
regime would also appear to be easier to coordinate owing to its tangibility, particularly on an 
informal basis.15
 
5.4 Pre-requisites for Formal Coordination 
Once the benefits of informal monetary policy cooperation have been full developed and the 
spirit of regionalism has been sufficiently cultivated, the question arises of whether to pursue formal 
monetary policy coordination. However, the lessons of modern monetary arrangements, from the 
                                                 
14 Examples are regimes used in Latin America in the 1980s and early 1990s. 
15 Should the East Asia weans itself off of its reliance on export-driven growth, increases intra-Asian demand 
and investment, sufficiently develops its domestic financial sectors, and upgrades its research infrastructure, the 
region could then sequence to the common adoption of flexible inflation targeting with an explicit exchange rate 
directive for financial stability purposes. 
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operation of 19th century gold standard to the pathway leading to European monetary union, call into 
question whether formal monetary policy coordination can be held up as a terminal goal for any 
participating country. Rather, there should be credible commitment to future monetary union. Formal 
monetary policy coordination only makes sense if participating countries are credibly committed to 
both the success of the monetary arrangement and the regional ideals that are reflected by its structure. 
If formal monetary policy coordination is to succeed, regional policymakers must accelerate domestic 
financial and institutional reforms, deepen regionalism, and ensure fiscal discipline. If they do not, 
then formal monetary arrangements may not advance regional stability beyond informal cooperation. 
In fact, if no such commitments exist and no such reforms are instituted, particularly among key 
countries, then formal policy coordination would not only run the risk of reducing gains from 
informal monetary policy cooperation but would perhaps serve to increase intra-regional instability. 
 
On this point, the European experience is instructive. Despite a remarkable shared cultural 
and political history and structurally homogenous economies, Europe struggled all along its fifty-year 
path toward monetary union. Had there been no firm commitment to the integrity of the European 
Monetary System (EMS) as a mechanism for intra-regional monetary policy coordination, then it is 
unlikely the EMS would have survived its largely unsuccessful initial phases from 1979-1985. 
Moreover, it is questionable whether participating countries would have been able to survive its 
experience with the EMS or even bothered to join without credible commitment to future monetary 
union. When a referendum is brought before an EU country on the future of Europe, there seem to be 
sharp reactions anecdotally in foreign exchange markets. Clearly, the ERM crisis was one such event, 
triggered by the 1992 rejection of the Maastricht Treaty by Denmark. Another was the rejection of the 
EU Constitution by both France and Holland in May and June 2004 respectively. In both cases, 
European currencies sold off on the added uncertainty over the future of Europe.  
 
The challenges for formal monetary arrangements in East Asia promise to be considerably 
more challenging. The diversity of East Asia will literally require a set of new regional economic and 
political institutions. Indeed, Wyplosz (2001) identified the lack of regional institutions as a key 
factor pointing to the non-viability of a single currency area in East Asia in the near future Should 
ultimate monetary unification is desired, it remains imperative that the region sequence formal 
monetary arrangements in a manner that accelerates the development of regional policy institutions. 
Doing so, offers the best chance for formal monetary arrangements to advance regional stability 
beyond informal cooperation. 
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6. Conclusion 
We identify the risks associated with the liberalization attempts of China—being an 
economically large and influential country—as representing the greatest challenge to the region. Even 
with successful financial liberalization in China, the massive capital flows that will be generated can 
destabilize the region. It is thus important for countries in East Asia, including China, to optimally 
cascade financial liberalization by simultaneously determining the extent of domestic financial 
liberalization, the degree of exchange rate flexibility and the scope of capital account liberalization 
consistent with underlying domestic institutional infrastructures. In addition, financial stability can be 
promoted via regional policy coordination. We are of the view that this will be most effective when 
approached as a series of nested sequencing problems that would take East Asia through increasingly 
intensive informal modes of monetary policy cooperation: starting with weak forms of cooperation 
that emphasize non-monetary cooperation and sovereign institutional reforms to more intensive 
modes of informal cooperation that can accelerate the development of deeper regionalism and 
synchronization, such as the adoption of common policy objectives, and finally to the most intensive 
mode of informal cooperation, the adoption of common policy regimes.  
 
Only when the East Asian countries could credibly commit to a path of future monetary union, 
then should formal monetary arrangements be considered to advance regional stability. Even if 
monetary union were deemed undesirable and formal monetary arrangements then unnecessary, 
informal monetary policy cooperation should greatly benefit East Asia. Through its sequencing, 
informal monetary policy cooperation can bring about a new era of understanding within the region of 
the interplay between policy regimes, agent behavior and spillover. Informal monetary policy 
cooperation is “informal” for good reason. While the political fallout from lack of good faith may be 
severe, there is no legal mechanism in place to compel central banks to comply. At the same, the lack 
of hard constraints avoids the problem of incessant realignments and one-sided bets that plagued 
EMS-1 from 1979-1995. 16  Informal yet vigorous cooperation can go a long way in improving 
sovereign and regional institutions both to handle ongoing financial liberalization and to promote 
intra-regional currency stability. 
                                                 
16 During this period, the EMS realigned eighteen times involving fifty-two currencies. See Baldwin & Wyplosz 
(2004), p 315. 
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